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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. NIELSEN, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. 
GOLD'S GYM and TROY PETERSON 
& ASSOCIATES 
Defendants-Appellees. 
) Case No. 20010510-SC 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3) (i) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Was a "commercial lease" unenforceable for lack of mutual 
assent as to the nature, extent, and boundary of the property to 
be leased, and the failure of the lease to assign the duty to pay 
for interior improvements ($168,000.00) to either party. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a trial court's interpretation of 
a contract is "correctness" or "correction of error". Seashores, 
Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
If the contract is ambiguous and the trial court received 
extrinsic evidence, the standard of review would be the more 
deferential ''clearly-erroneous" standard. (Barnes v. Woodf 750 
P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah App. 1988). 
Finally, if a party challenges the trial court's 
interpretation of an ambiguous contract, that party must marshal 
all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support 
the findings and demonstrate why the findings are clearly 
erroneous. (Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547, (Utah App. 1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellee knows of no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations which are determinative of this 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case, the trial court found that 
Plaintiff/Appellant, hereinafter referred to as "Nielsen" failed 
to sustain his burden of proof that there was a "meeting of the 
minds" as to essential, material terms of a lease agreement, 
namely what was the nature, extent, and boundary of the property 
to be leased, and which party was to pay for improvements to the 
subject property. 
The trial court found the lease agreement unenforceable for 
lack of mutual assent and Nielsen filed this appeal. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Nielsen filed a Verified Complaint on August 25, 1998, in 
Utah County, State of Utah. [R. 8]. 
Defendant/Appellee, hereinafter referred to as "Peterson", 
filed his Answer on September 14, 1998. [R. 15] . 
Trial was held on December 12, 2000, and a Ruling was issued 
on January 24, 2001. [R. 120]. 
Nielsen filed his Objection to the proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Dismissal. [R. 128], 
The trial court considered the objections of Nielsen, denied 
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the same, and executed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Judgment of Dismissal. [R. 142]. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of 
Dismissal were entered on May 11, 2001. [R. 148, 151] . 
Nielsen appealed the trial court's Judgment of Dismissal on 
June 11, 2001. [R. 156]. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The trial court considered the evidence presented by the 
parties, considered the argument of counsel and applicable cases, 
and issued its final ruling that Nielsen did not sustain his 
burden of proof and that his Complaint should be dismissed. 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On August 18, 1997, Nielsen and Peterson signed a 
"commercial lease" which referred to "premises" described as a 
strip mall at 1341 E. Center, Spanish Fork, Utah, 84660. [R. 3]. 
2. The lease was prepared by Nielsen. [R. 161, H 33, L. 
12-13; P. 35, L. 20]. 
3. At the time of the signing, the mall was under 
construction. [R. 119, K 2]. 
4. At the time of the signing, the property was not zoned 
for the operation of a health club. [R. 119]. 
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5. The lease was presented to Spanish Fork City's zoning 
commission which granted a zoning change to accommodate the 
operation of a health club. [R. 119, % 4] . 
6. The "premises" were not ready for occupancy on August 
18, 1997, nor on November 1, 1997. [R. 161, P. 37, L. 2-6; L. 
17-21]. 
7. The responsibility for paying the cost of improvements 
was not addressed in the lease. [R. 161, P. 37-38, L. 3] . 
8. The utilities were always in the name of Nielsen. [R. 
161, P. 38, L. 4-11]. 
9. Nielsen never gave Peterson written notice that he 
could take possession of the "premises". [R. 161, P. 39, L. 6-
10] . 
10. Nielsen failed to fill in the blanks on paragraph 
number nine (9) which allowed the tenant to terminate the lease 
if possession of the "premises" were not delivered [R. 3, % Sub-
paragraph number fourteen (14) regarding notice, [R. 3, ^ 14]; 
paragraph number twenty-two (22) regarding the rental amount upon 
exercise of an option to renew [R. 3, % 22]; and paragraph number 
twenty-four (24) regarding radon gas in the buildings [R. 3, % 
24] . 
11. The addendum to the lease was not signed by either 
party. [R. 1] . 
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12. Peterson obtained architectural plans and an estimate 
for improvements. [R. 119, P. 6-7]. 
13. Nielsen and Peterson disagreed as to who would pay the 
cost of improvements ($168,000.00). [R. 119, 118, % 8]. 
14. Gold's Gym never moved into the premises. [R. 118, <f 
9] . 
15. On February 3, 1998, Nielsen gave Peterson written 
notice terminating the lease. [Exhibit 5]. 
16. One day later, on February 4, 1998, Nielsen entered 
into a lease agreement with World's Gym (Jimmy Zufelt) for the 
premises. [Exhibit 17]. 
17. The trial court found that mutual assent regarding 
price, duration, and the extent and boundary of the property was 
required [R. 117, 145], that the lease was "utterly silent" on 
who was to pay for improvements ($168,000.00) [R. 116], and that 
Nielsen had failed to show a meeting of the minds on each 
material term. [R. 116, 115, 114]. 
18. In addition, the trial court found that improvements 
were not even discussed until weeks after the lease was signed 
[R. 115], and that while Nielsen argued "industry standard", no 
evidence was presented whatsoever to support his contention [R. 
115] . 
19. Finally, the trial court found that Nielsen himself 
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told KBR Construction (Buck Robinson) that no agreement had yet 
been reached with respect to interior improvements. [R. 114] . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The commercial lease was ambiguous and incomplete on its 
face by failing to define the nature, extent, and boundary of the 
lease property and by failing to assign the duty to pay for 
interior improvements ($168,000.00) to either party. 
There was no mutual assent or meeting of the minds as to 
essential, material terms of the agreement and therefore the 
lease was unenforceable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The "commercial lease" was ambiguous and 
incomplete on its face by failing to define the nature, extent, 
and boundary of the lease property, and by failing to assign the 
duty to pay for interior improvements ($168,000.00) to either 
party. 
In finding the lease in the instant case unenforceable, the 
trial court carefully considered conditions precedent to the 
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enforcement of a contract and the requirement of mutual assent to 
all material terms. 
In the case of Candland v. Oldrovd 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah 
1926), the court stated in part, as follows: 
Mutual assent is fundamental to every 
enforceable contract. It means that each 
party has "a definite, understandable, and 
unequivocal meeting of the minds upon the 
terms of the contract"; that is to say, each 
party must agree without reservation to what 
he is required to do and to what the other 
party is required and expected to do. 
In the instant case, neither party understood who was to pay 
for interior improvements and in fact had not discussed the 
matter prior to execution of the lease. [R. 161, P. 37-38, L.3]. 
The cost of the interior improvements was $168,000.00. [R. 119, 
P. 6-7]. Nielsen and Peterson disagreed as to who was 
responsible to pay these costs and the lease was silent on the 
matter. [R. 119, 118, P. 8]. 
In the case of Commercial Union Associates, 863 P.2d 29, 36-
37 (Utah App. 1993), the court stated in part, as follows: 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of 
any contract is that there be a meeting of 
the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or implicitly, 
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced. 
In the instant case, the lease was completely silent 
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regarding the duty to install and pay for interior improvements 
and accordingly, no duty could be assigned or enforcement 
obtained regarding this material term. 
Nielsen had the burden of proof to show "the parties' mutual 
assent as to all material terms and conditions." Cal Wadsworth 
Construction v. City of St. George 898 P.2d 1372. 1376 (Utah 
1995). 
In the instant case, Nielsen conceded that the duty to pay 
for improvements was not discussed prior to execution of the 
lease, but went on to argue that "industry custom" could 
establish the missing term. However, Nielsen failed to present 
any evidence that such an industry custom existed. 
It is noteworthy that Nielsen argued that the lease was 
fully integrated and that no extrinsic evidence should be 
considered. [R. 115, Note 7], The trial court observed that 
Nielsen urged consideration of trade usage or custom to fill in 
the missing term. Such trade usage or custom would be "wholly 
dependent on extrinsic evidence". [R. 115, Note 8]. 
The trial court cited the case of Birdzell v. Utah Oil 
Refining Company. 242 P.2d 578. 580 (Utah 1952) for the following 
proposition: 
. . . it may be stated as settled law that a 
memorandum of agreement for a lease which is 
required to be in writing, in order to 
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satisfy the statute of frauds, must contain 
all the essential and material parts of the 
lease which is to be executed thereafter 
according to its terms, and particularly must 
contain three (3) essentials in order to 
(sic) its validity under that statute of 
frauds. These are: First, a definite 
agreement as to the extent and boundary of 
the property to be leased; Second, a definite 
and agreed term; and Third, a definite and 
agreed rental and the time and manner of its 
payment. 
In the instant case, the lease referred to "the premises" as 
"a strip mall at 1341 E. Center, Spanish Fork, Utah, 84660". [R. 
3] . 
Exhibit 2, Attachment A, submitted at trial by Nielsen, 
refers to the premises containing 18,315 square feet [Exhibit 2]. 
The bid for interior improvements of $168,000.00 refers to 11,032 
square feet [Exhibit 14]. 
The lease fails to specify the square footage at all, and an 
addendum to the lease, not executed by either party, refers to 
"over 10,000 square feet" or "otherwise". [R. 3 and R. 1]. 
Finally, paragraph number three (3) of the lease imposes a 
duty on the lessee to maintain the premises "in as good condition 
as received". [R. 3]. The trial court noted that this provision 
appeared to impose the duty to complete the interior improvements 
on Nielsen. [R. 116, Note 5]. 
Nielsen argues that the lease was not ambiguous as to a 
10 
description of the "premises". The record however, reveals that 
the "premises" could be: 
1. An entire strip mall; [R. 3] 
2. 18,315 square feet; [Exhibit 2, Attachment A] 
3. 11,032 square feet; [Exhibit 14] 
4. Over 10,000 square feet; [R. 3 and R. 1] 
5. Other than 10,00 0 square feet; [R.3 and R. 1] 
6. A shell; [R. 116, Note 6] 
7. A finished building. [R. 116, Note 6]. 
In the case of Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57,60 
(Utah APTD. 1990) the court stated, in part, as follows: 
Language in a written document is ambiguous 
if the words used may be understood to 
support two or more plausible meanings. 
In the instant case, the "premises" could be understood to 
support up to seven (7) plausible meanings. The lease is 
therefore ambiguous and incomplete and therefore unenforceable. 
II. There was no mutual assent as to essential, material 
terms and therefore the lease is unenforceable. 
The trial court found the lease deficient and incomplete 
because it did not assign which party was to pay for the interior 
improvements. Having found the lease to be insufficient, the 
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trial court looked to extrinsic evidence for clarification. 
However, the trial court stated: 
Nor does the extrinsic evidence establish the 
necessary assent. In this case each party 
conceded that improvements were not even 
discussed until well after the contract had 
been signed. This fact precludes the 
possibility that some oral understanding was 
reached at the time of contract execution as 
to payment for the improvements. [R. 115, P. 
1 3 . 
Both parties conceded that the subject was not discussed 
until "well after" the lease was signed. Nielsen argued 
"industry custom" but provided no evidence of the same. [R. 115, 
P. 1] . 
In the case of West Valley City v. Majestic Ink Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991) the court stated in part as 
follows: 
We review the trial court's construction 
based on extrinsic evidence under the more 
deferential clearly-erroneous standard. A 
party challenging the court's interpretation 
of ambiguous terms of a contract faces a 
substantial appellant burden. We affirm the 
trial court's findings if they are based on 
sufficient evidence, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's 
construction. 
In the instant case, Nielsen did not challenge the findings 
of the trial court, did not marshal all relevant evidence to 
support the findings, and then demonstrate why the findings are 
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clearly erroneous, and therefore the trial court's finding that 
there was no meeting of the minds regarding an essential material 
term is unrebutted. 
In the absence of mutual assent as to essential, material 
terms, the lease is unenforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged that the trial court's conclusion 
that the lease is unenforceable for lack of mutual assent should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this _3 day of ft <j , 2002. 
C. 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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